earlier. Despite many improvements to the tourism infrastructure, citizens continued to demand more, asserting themselves as consumers. By this time, the regime’s ideological messages about the educational and patriotic functions of tourism had essentially vanished.

What conclusions does Koenker draw from this story? The history of Soviet tourism reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system. On the positive side, tourism “provided a sense of material and cultural well-being, created cohesive collectives and satisfied to some extent the desires of Soviet people to expand their horizons” (p. 281). On the other hand, it also showed the regime’s economic insufficiency, which made it difficult to meet consumer demand; its failure to expand freedom of travel both inside and outside the USSR; and the exclusion of ethnic minorities and workers from this new vision of the good life.

Club Red is perhaps too densely detailed for some, but those who persevere will be rewarded by seeing Soviet society from a unique and valuable vantage point. Koenker is to be commended for bringing this story to light and to life.

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Steven E. Harris’s study of Nikita Khrushchev’s campaign to provide most Soviet citizens with single-family apartments in the 1950s and early 1960s illustrates how a well-intentioned Soviet policy could simultaneously improve people’s lives and generate widespread discontent. This book contributes an important perspective to our understanding of the period of Khrushchev’s thaw and the Soviet Union’s development following Joseph Stalin’s death. Rather than viewing the thaw primarily as a phenomenon of the cultural and political elite, Harris focuses on some of the fundamental ways in which the Khrushchev government’s new approach to ruling the Soviet Union affected the lives of ordinary people. He argues that the era’s mass housing campaign, like many aspects of the thaw, was seen by Khrushchev as a way to correct a Stalinist deviation from socialism and put the Soviet Union back on the path to communism, in this case by continuing “the project of creating a classless society” (p. 4). Harris shows, however, that instead of creating a more harmonious society, the mass housing campaign ignited new tensions and “touched off a crisis of rising expectations” (p. 9).

Harris begins his study by placing Soviet housing policies in the context of the pan-European housing reform movement of the nineteenth century. He finds that Russian architects and officials after the revolution embraced the idea of a sanitary minimum living space that had been established elsewhere in Europe, but the Soviet version developed some crucial differences. In the USSR, the minimum living space became the maximum allowed in many housing designs. Russian and Soviet architects also used the term “living space” to refer only to the floor space in a dwelling’s main rooms. The floor space in kitchens, bathrooms, and corridors was termed “auxiliary space.” This distinction continued through the Khrushchev years and contributed to the construction of small, uncomfortable apartments. Harris explains that these apartments were designed with limited auxiliary space, which kept costs down without affecting required living space norms, and the main rooms were designed as walk-through rooms that would eliminate the need for corridors and prevent apartments meant for single families from being converted to communal use. While the replacement of Stalin-era communal apartments with single-family apartments represented a significant improvement in most people’s living situation, Harris documents pervasive dissatisfaction with the new apartments due to their small size, shoddy construction, and lack of privacy.

The construction of millions of new apartments, Harris shows, also became a catalyst for mass consumerism in the Soviet Union. Harris focuses on the need for new furniture. He discusses the many new furniture designs meant to help make the small apartments more livable, but he finds that many people never saw such furniture in their local stores. Harris located records of people’s complaints about their new apartments, their inability to find decent furniture, and their other housing issues in the minutes of residential housing committees, in the comment books at housing exhibitions, and in people’s letters to newspapers. His use of these sources allows the voices of common people to be heard, and it represents one of the great strengths of this study.

Harris locates the roots of the Khrushchev-era housing program in the Stalin years, but he explains that the ideologies associated with housing construction in the two eras differed significantly. He notes that under Stalin there had been a place for single-family apartments in Soviet socialism. With Stalin, however, such apartments were meant only for the party and technical elite, and they were part of Stalin’s desire for a socially stratified society. Khrushchev, in contrast, wanted a personal apartment for every family, which would, he argued, help create a classless society. Likewise, Harris explains that mass housing construction began in the late Stalin years but with no ideological vision beyond postwar reconstruction and recovery (p. 93), while the Khrushchev regime believed that its mass housing campaigns would fulfill the revolution’s project of creating the New Soviet Man and Woman (p. 230).

The book’s arguments are clearly explained and well documented, but more information on the era’s high politics would have helped Harris complete his study of Khrushchev’s mass housing campaign. For example, he mentions in his conclusion that in 1967 (three years after Khrushchev’s removal) the government acknowledged the problems caused by housing designs that restricted auxiliary space, and it announced a plan to start building bigger apartments (p. 301). The reader is left
to wonder why the designs for living space and auxiliary space that produced such unsatisfactory dwellings and so many complaints in the 1950s and early 1960s had not been revised while Khrushchev was first secretary.

ERIC DUSKIN
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Once the holy grail for sovietologists, who saw in it the outlines of what the silent majority of Soviet citizens were too afraid to say, dissent has fallen on hard times in recent years as a scholarly topic. Stephen Kotkin has challenged the notion, which was always more seductive than substantiated, that dissidents played a leading role in the collapse of Eastern European and Soviet communism. Juliane Fürst has drawn a distinction between resistance to Soviet power, which was rare, and non-conformity to Soviet strictures and morals, which was increasingly common in the postwar decades. And Alexei Yurchak has argued that the young urban intelligentsia of the Brezhnev years lived both within and beyond official ideologies. In a place where so many mild forms of dissent and nonconformism were both tolerated and ubiquitous, was not the act of dissent less significant than sovietologists once imagined?

Robert Hornsby’s careful study of dissent during the Khrushchev years seeks to restore the idea that political dissent was a central and significant component of post-Stalinist politics and society. Basing his analysis on the case files of the Soviet Procuracy, which pursued dissenters under the criminal code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, which forbade anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, Hornsby does several things. First, he argues that Khrushchev-era dissent was not solely or even primarily an affliction of the intelligentsia. This stance puts him at odds with a longstanding historiography that privileges the role of the intelligentsia. This involved not only more invasive forms of policing and peer surveillance (which are often associated with the Khrushchev years), but greater attention to public opinion surveys, growing reliance on information passed along by “trusted people” (p. 203), aggressive countermeasures against foreign propaganda and immigrant organizations such as Radio Liberty and the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (Narodno-trudovoi soiuz, NTS), and on occasion the use of force. In regard to the latter, Hornsby shows unequivocally that the strategies of so-called soft repression of the Brezhnev years, particularly the forced commitment of dissenters to psychiatric hospitals, had their roots in the early 1960s. Hornsby’s work thus contributes to a growing body of literature that seeks to challenge the popular and scholarly perception that the Khrushchev regime was more benevolent than what followed.

Perhaps the most significant criticism to be lodged against Hornsby’s work is that it is more a synthesis of recent scholarship than a trailblazing presentation of new materials. For instance, many of the Procuracy documents that are central to his analysis were first brought to light by the Russian archivist-historians Vladimir Kozlov and Sergei Mironenko. To his credit, Hornsby does not gloss over his debts, and without question he adds more analytical heft than Kozlov and Mironenko. To his credit, Hornsby does not gloss over his debts, and without question he adds more analytical heft than Kozlov and Mironenko. In an influential article from the late 1970s, the historian John Bushnell argued that the “new Soviet man” turned pessimistic after 1968, amid mounting evidence of economic failures and a widening affluence gap with the West. Hornsby’s principal achievement is demonstrating that popular pessimism and anger had momentous repercussions for Soviet citizens and their leaders long before previous historians thought.

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Historians’ interest in travel and geographical literature as a source of stereotypes has increased in recent